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October 9, 2015 
Aggregate Demand and Defensive Spending in the United States 
from the Second World War to the End of the Twentieth Century 
 In his 2011 book, The Better Angels of Our Nature, Steven Pinker, a noted professor of 
psychology at Harvard University, puts forth the proposition that, over the course of civilized 
history, the incidence of aggression has declined, and that we, due to this trend, are presently 
living in the most peaceable period in human history (Pinker, p. xxi.).  Pinker makes many 
compelling arguments, citing numerous statistics, recounting the rise of rationality in modern 
times, and specifying the psychological underpinnings of the trends he identifies (Pinker, p. 
xxiii.).  Despite the optimism these arguments engender, if society is to be fully purged of 
violence, it will be necessary to identify and modify the values and institutions which sustain it.  
This is especially true on the level of the state, defined by the German sociologist Max Weber as 
an institution which holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of aggression (Pinker, p. 158).  One 
of the most egregious cancers ailing modern society is the militarism of American foreign policy 
(The Good Society, p. 97).  The interventionist outlook can be traced back to the Second World 
War, which taught economists that high military spending can be advantageous to capitalism.  
 The advantages of a high defensive budget were first described by John Maynard Keynes 
(appointed Lord Keynes in 1942), the foremost theorist of macroeconomic policy of the first half 
of the twentieth century.  Keynes proposed his policies following the onset of rampant and 
severe depression in the United States, United Kingdom, and other Western countries during the 
1930s (Hunt and Lautzenheiser, p. 402).  The Depression was the direct result of the barbaric 
conflicts and unchecked cycles inherent to uninhibited capitalism, convincing many that the 
Martin 2 
spheres of production and consumption could not be fully trusted to rule themselves.  Keynes 
attributed the frequency of depressions in the capitalist mode of production to a disproportion 
between heightened levels of saving, on the one hand, and lowered rates of investment, on the 
other (Hunt and Lautzenheiser, p. 411).  The high levels of saving reduced the aggregate demand 
of the economy, engendering a surplus in the production of goods for consumption (Hunt and 
Lautzenheiser, p. 411).  Thus, businesses were compelled to lower production, reduce wages, 
and lay off workers in order to keep a tight profit (Hunt and Lautzenheiser, p. 412).  In the words 
of John Kenneth Galbraith, “A new economic equilibrium was thus established, one with a lot of 
people out of work -- the underemployment equilibrium” (A Life in Our Times, p. 65). The 
structure of capitalism showed its deficiencies, rotted from its interior by those very forces of 
supply and demand that erected it. 
 The cure for the depression, Keynes believed, was for the government to raise aggregate 
demand by spending money (Hunt and Lautzenheiser, p. 412).  Keynes thought it possible for the 
government to play a benevolent role in the economy, where others had suggested that only the 
forces of free market capitalism could rule effectively.  The perfect opportunity to put Keynes’s 
policies to the test arrived with the beginning of the involvement of the United States in the 
Second World War.  Just as Keynes predicted, as the call went out for workers in the production 
of armaments, the “underemployment equilibrium” soon disappeared, and was substituted with a 
nagging deficiency in the number of workers (Gordon, p. 358).  While the Second World War 
was being fought, the United States produced 296,400 airplanes; 86,330 tanks; 64,546 landing 
craft; 6,500 battleships, subs, and other naval vessels; 3,500,000 jeeps, trucks, and vehicles; 
53,000,000 tons of cargo vessels; 12,000,000 rifles, carbines, and machine guns; 47,000,000 tons 
of shells, in addition to the countless numbers of other items required when fighting a war 
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(Gordon, p. 353).  Germany and Japan, confronted with the full productive capacity of the 
American economy, didn’t stand a chance.  It appeared that Keynes’s theories were vindicated, 
and a strongly Keynesian orthodoxy arose among American economists (Hunt and 
Lautzenheiser, p. 415).  
 The United States was left with a problem, however.  In order to maintain the appropriate 
level of aggregate demand through a high defensive budget, the government was pressured to 
justify its financial decisions to the taxpayer (Hunt and Lautzenheiser, p. 420).  Thus, like Atlas 
resting the sky upon his mighty shoulders, the government was forced to adopt a disagreeable 
position to uphold its commitment.  The United States was compelled to be an aggressive power, 
perpetually seeking threats to justify military intervention.  Happily enough, following the 
Second World War, the U.S.S.R. positioned Marxist-Leninist governments to uphold its power 
in the Eastern European countries of Romania, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria.  
Through the skillful use of propaganda, the government of the United States convinced its people 
-- and, at times, perhaps, even itself -- that the latter half of the twentieth century was defined by 
the struggle between capitalism and communism, two ideologies, two narratives of history, both 
convinced of their own righteousness, and both willing to spend billions of dollars to defend their 
interests throughout the world, wherever the opposition decided to strike. 
 This retelling of the late twentieth century may sound rather disingenuous, for it denies 
that ideology or belief played any substantive role in America’s involvement in the Cold War, 
which cannot be entirely true.  It is not within the scope of this paper to judge how severe or 
persistent paranoia about the rise of communist ideology proved to be in the decision of the 
United States to engage in the proxy wars of the late twentieth century.  It is merely our concern 
to suggest that ideology was not the only force that made itself felt in these decisions, to peer 
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intently behind the drapery of rhetoric, to better see the true motor forces driving the movements 
of men and governments.  The  influence of capitalism is persistent at every level of the society 
in which it is the entrenched mode of production, and the egocentric instincts which it marshals 
are common to every person.  Thus, it is not illogical to hold that the crimes and follies of the 
late twentieth century were prompted by greed, as well as fear.  However, the time for heedless 
belligerence and blind jingoism is over.  It is now the duty of everyone to turn censorious eyes 
onto the policies and decisions of their government, and to energetically check the corruption 
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